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In this paper Herman, building on insights from Plantain, Hitchcock, and others, undertakes an 
expansion of the Toulmin framework in order to address what he sees as four problems. These 
problems, as he sees them, are: 1) that Toulmin's conception of Data as facts is overly restrictive, 
2) that the nature of the Backing in Toulmin's writings is in need of further development, 3) that 
Toulmin's conception of the Rebuttal does not comport with natural argumentation practices, and 
4) that the Toulmin model needs expansion in order to deal with more complex argument 
structures. The task of addressing these four problems leads to an expanded conception of the 
“argumentative cell”. Along the way to this solution Herman also identifies what he calls the 
“bias of objectivity”. In what follows I will offer some thoughts, and what I hope will be some 
helpful suggestions regarding both the project of expanding the argumentative cell and the idea 
of a bias of objectivity.  
 
2. Expanding the “argumentative cell” 
 
The four problems Herman identifies deal with the elements of Data, Backing and Rebuttal 
respectively followed by problems concerning complexity in argument structure. In the interest 
of brevity I will focus my remarks on the first two of these. Before passing on to my remarks on 
Data and Backing as considered in Herman's paper I will simply say that I find the “argument 
square”, Herman's linguistically-oriented model of argument structure, to be an interesting one. It 
would be an interesting, if perhaps exhausting, exercise to compare and contrast this model with 
others more focused on pragmatics and communication, different conceptions of dialectic, or 
logic of various types. Much might be learned from such a project, but it is too large scale an 




Herman begins his expansion of the argumentative cell by drawing on the work of Freeman 
(2005) and others to expand Toulmin's idea of Data. In real world examples of argumentation, 
Herman tells us, speakers called upon to produce Data “do not use facts, but evaluative 
statements and interpretations as Data for an (evaluative) statement in the Claim” (p. 7). To 
better reflect this practice, Herman recommends an expansion of the concept of Data to include 
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two kinds of opinion in addition to facts. The question Herman rightly raises as always pertinent 
when dealing with Data is “where do the facts come from?” This is a question that Toulmin 
himself recognized would be in play in some arguments:  
 
...if the claim is challenged, it is up to us to appeal to these facts, and present them 
as the foundation upon which our claim is based. Of course, we may not get the 
challenger even to agree about the correctness of these facts, and in that case we 
have to clear his objection out of the way by a preliminary argument: only when 
this this prior issue or 'lemma', as geometers would call it, has been dealt with, are 
we in a position to return to the original argument. (Toulmin 2003, p. 90) 
 
It is easy to imagine a suspicion that opinion is being presented as Data as the sort of thing that 
might indicate the need for one of Toulmin's “lemmas”. It is in this section of the paper that 
Herman describes what he calls the “bias of objectivity”, but as I shall deal with this in the next 




Toulmin has little to say about the sort of argument needed to establish the correctness of the 
Data when the Data is challenged. It is for this reason that Herman's suggestion that there might 
be a separate form of Backing, grounded in the linguistic phenomenon of evidentiality is one of 
the most helpful contributions of this paper. For, in the absence of such a suggestion, the 
challenge to a datum could only be answered by a second argument in which the evidence given 
in the original was treated as the Claim to be shown. This process, naturally, could iterate with 
further challenges and very quickly become difficult to analyze—Herman explicitly considers 
such cases in setting out his model of the argumentative cell. The notion that evidentiality might 
be brought in to establish a separate sort of Backing for Data is therefore an elegant and 
promising alternative to have on hand. Additionally, it is worth pointing out that Herman's 
suggestion that there is an implicit commitment to back up information by giving its source—a 
commitment importantly different from the commitment to support a claim—is a very helpful 
one. “Always be prepared to give your sources.”, is perennial advice. Herman's account of the 
need for Data to have a Backing helps us explain why it is good advice. 
 
3. The “bias of objectivity”   
 
In his discussion of the Data, Herman suggests the following (his emphasis): 
 
Data can appear to be shared arguments that are external to any discussion about 
them. So, it can be a strong rhetorical move to impose them when there are in fact 
debatable. In the same way, I consider that facts working as the starting point of 
argumentation are supposed to be true. It is also a strong rhetorical move if these 
facts are unknown or even false. This is where I can locate what I call an 
objectivity bias: the idea is that opinions appear to be already shared starting 
points of argumentations or that facts appear to be true. (p. 8) 
 
Upon reading this one might be put in mind of Rule 6 of the pragma-dialectical framework: “A 
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party may not falsely present a premise as an accepted starting point nor deny a premise 
representing an accepted starting point” (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004). What Herman 
calls the objectivity bias sounds in many ways just like a violation of Rule 6—in order to gain 
argumentative advantage something is asserted as Data, as factual, when in fact it isn't. In the 
pragma-dialectical model violations of Rule 6 are typically explained in terms of a protagonist's 
attempt to gain advantage by shifting the burden of proof by asserting or implying that her 
standpoint is “shared by all right-thinking people”, or by packaging it in such a way as to insert it 
as a presupposition that has to be accepted in order to be responded to in dialogue (van Eemeren 
and Grootendorst 1992, pp. 151-157) . 
  There are some slight differences between what Herman is calling the objectivity bias 
and violations of Rule 6 however. Perhaps the most apparent of these is that Rule 6 applies to 
standpoints, which better analogize to Claims in the Toulmin model than to Data. The objectivity 
bias comes in to play with Data, as Herman has it—occurring when Data is imposed on an 
audience either by strong assertion of its factual nature or by refusal to supply an appropriate 
Backing for it. Still another difference is that Herman does not describe the effect of the 
objectivity bias in terms of a shifting of the burden of proof. Instead, he describes it as “a sort of 
authoritarian assertion by the speaker” that plays on the apparent facticity we expect from Data 
to generate an “obviousness effect” that insulates the Data from criticism. This effect is 
amplified by our epistemic and practical need to start from some sort of commonly shared 
propositions when arguing (p. 9).  
  Might the phenomenon Herman describes also generate the same sort of burden-of-proof 
shifting effects as a violation of Rule 6? It seems perfectly possible to me that it might. In fact, it 
seems to me that something like Herman's “obviousness effect” might be at work in some 
variations of the ad vericundiam or ad populum fallacies too. This leads me to one problem I 
have with Herman's idea of an objectivity bias: The phenomenon Herman has identified here is 
an important one, but I am unpersuaded that there is a single, unified bias to be identified. 
Instead, it seems to me far more helpful to think in terms of what Herman calls the “obviousness 
effect” that results from the objectivity bias. In addition to contributing to perspicuous analyses 
of what's going on in a range of cases like the ones I have mentioned above, it seems to me that 
shifting away from the language of bias to the language of an effect might have other 
advantages. Firstly, it makes Herman's insight generalizable in a way that enables its use across 
models of argumentation instead of restricting it to variations of the Toulmin model. Secondly, 
and no less importantly, it avoids problems that stem from the ambiguous and unsettled nature of 
the word 'bias'. Are we talking about a cognitive or a moral failing? A predictable blind spot in 
someone's thinking or a bad argumentative habit? Without more discussion of what is implied by 
'bias' here, it is difficult to know which of these possibilities among the many others Herman 
might intend. Better—and far more useful, it seems—is the language of the “obviousness effect”. 
One indication of that usefulness is that empirical testing could be constructed to identify and 
measure the obviousness effect in audiences without much further refinement to the concept. I 
am not sure the idea of the objectivity bias is quite as serviceable in its present form.  
 
4. Conclusion  
 
Herman's expansive paper has much to recommend it, particularly as regards interesting and 
potentially fruitful ways of expanding the Toulmin model to better capture insights and evidence 
from linguistics and the study of argumentation that might not have been available when 
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Toulmin initially wrote The Uses of Argument. While I am somewhat less convinced that there is 
a need to coin a new, singular bias called the bias of objectivity, it seems to me a very 
worthwhile instinct to explore the role of the “obviousness effect” in the family of mistakes, 
fallacies, and cognitive biases that have a false perception of facticity as their focal center. For 
these reasons I look forward to future expansions of the work Herman has begun here. 
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